Hanford Vitrification Plant
GAP Program Highlight: Wrongdoing Exposed at Hanford!
May 1, 2006
Today, GAP has released several documents that expose gross managerial wrongdoing and incompetence at the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) in Washington state. The documents indicate that the Department of Energy (DOE) and the contractor in charge of cleanup at the site, Bechtel, have knowingly installed defective equipment that is supposed to contain high-level nuclear waste. These, and numerous other actions, have endangered the citizens of the Pacific Northwest.
Click here to read GAP’s press release!
Click here to read the timeline of the “Scrubber vessel,” the vessel described above as one of several defective pieces installed, and the corresponding documents proving DOE and Bechtel knew of its problems before installation.
Click here to read GAP’s Hanford Vitrification Plant Background!
The installation of one known defective vessel was the result of Bechtel’s rush to receive a $15 million fee for meeting a deadline, coupled with a complete lack of oversight by DOE. This was only to be followed months later by another DOE payment to Bechtel of $22 million for Bechtel’s use in taking steps to combat its own negligence and incompetence.
Up to 66 other vessels crucial for environmental safety and public health were built using incorrect specifications. GAP is urging for these vessels to be reinspected to ensure public and worker safety.
Regrettably, this is not the first time that the WTP has come under harsh criticism. When the project originally began, the DOE approved a “fast track” approach to the project. This decision has proven to be a disaster. Equipment installed by Bechtel has consistently failed to meet specifications, causing a serious threat to the safety of the general public. A total lack of foresight has left the WTP site vulnerable to an earthquake. Given the fact that Hanford is close to one of the world’s most active fault lines, such poor planning is inexcusable. This mistake alone raised the WTP construction budget from approximately $6 billion to $10 billion.
The problems that plague Hanford can be attributed to a tremendous lack of oversight on the project. Bechtel has consistently cut corners because the DOE failed to adequately supervise the ongoing construction of the plant in a manner that ensures citizen safety. While the residents of Washington have been fortunate that Bechtel’s substandard work has not caused a catastrophe to this point, future negligence on the part of Bechtel could prove tragic. Therefore, it is imperative that DOE and Bechtel are held accountable for their actions.
Specifically, GAP is again calling for real, independent oversight of the project – namely that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) get involved. DOE has been proved incompetent and incapable of handling this massive program. It is time for the NRC, a body well respected and known for heavy and thorough scrutiny of projects dealing with nuclear waste, to have total control of this project.
GAP will continue to advocate for more openness and transparency in the Hanford clean-up effort. We will not allow Bechtel and the DOE to continue to endanger the health and safety of thousands.
Update: New Document Found
Here is a link to the NRC’s Closeout Review of the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant from the year 2001. This document found severe deficiencies in the design of the plant, and warned against significant accident risks if the plant were allowed to operate with the deficiencies uncorrected. The Department of Energy has yet to issue any kind of analysis, response or formal corrective action related to this review.
Update: Hanford Vitrification Plant Report Exposes Incompetence, Mismanagement
A front page story in the December 1 edition of the Seattle Times details an Army Corps of Engineers report showing mismanagement has plagued the construction and development of the Hanford vitrification plant, a facility designed to mix high-level nuclear waste with glass. The study, completed in May and a "closely guarded federal report," estimates that the plant’s construction budget could rise by $4 billion, from $5.8 billion to $9.65 billion, in addition to being completed four years behind schedule. Click here to read the Seattle Times story.
GAP has closely watched and monitored the construction of the vitrification plant for years, consistently calling for increased oversight and independent review. GAP collaborated on a report released last year detailing other major problems with the plant. This report was authored by Robert Alvarez, a former Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary for National Security and the Environment. Click here to read the Alvarez report!
Vitrification Plant History
There are 177 underground tanks at Hanford containing 53 million gallons of radioactive and chemical waste. This production threatens the Columbia River and the millions of people living downstream from Hanford, because:
• Of the 177 underground tanks at Hanford, 149 are single-shell tanks.
• Some are more than 50 years old and all are decades beyond their design life.
• Nearly half of the single-shell tanks have leaked a million gallons of hazardous, radioactive liquid into the soil.
• Some of this waste has reached the groundwater, and the nearby Columbia River, at a point 200 miles upstream from Portland.
One proposed solution for solving the Hanford tank waste problem was to build the world’s largest radioactive waste vitrification plant. With vitrification, the radioactive waste is blended with glass at extremely high temperatures. Low-activity waste is destined for on-site temporary storage, while high-level waste would then be transported off-site.
This current plan was enacted in 1996, and is the fourth total attempt at a Hanford vitrification plant in the last 15 years. This facility originally was projected to cost $5.6 billion dollars to build, with an additional $45-$60 billion more to operate it for 28 years (see update above). Incidentally, this project was “fast-tracked,” meaning that construction of it began prior to the final designs being set.
The plant was originally to begin interim operations by 2007, and in full production of radioactive glass logs by 2011. By 2018 the plant was supposed to have vitrified 10 percent of the tank waste by volume, 25 percent of the radioactivity. It is the world’s largest environmental remediation project.
One major problem with the plant is a lack of transparent oversight. The process is locally controlled by the Office of River Protection, which is a subset of the Department of Energy. For this project and others, the DOE previously worked with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), an independent agency established by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to regulate civilian use of nuclear materials.
A 2001 NRC report stated that there’s a 2.4% annual risk of a major radiological or chemical accident occurring within the vitrification plant each year over the 28-year expected lifespan usage, if no future correctional steps were taken. This works out to a 50 percent chance of a major incident over the course of the lifespan of plant operations. Later that year, DOE cut its ties to the NRC, leaving only DOE-controlled ORP to address the issues. DOE has never issued a response to the NRC report.
NRC was the last independent agency to review the project. Since that time, DOE has altered plant designs and sped up construction to save on costs. Building before final designs were in place, or “fast-tracking,” the DOE was heavily criticized by the Government Accountability Office.
GAP and the Institute for Policy Studies released a report addressing these problems and lack of remedy in July 2004. The report was authored by Bob Alvarez, an adviser to the energy secretary under the Clinton administration.
The DOE responded by saying that design problems were resolved in the years since, but didn’t offer any details of substance. The Office of River Protection has stated that the 2001 report was based the work of a specific contractor, who has since been switched since that time. However, changes in design plans were not addressed in detail.
Sen. Maria Cantwell, after reading the 2001 report, sent a letter to then-Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, saying that the accusations were “quite startling” and that “it is not at all clear how and if DOE has responded to the NRC’s findings regarding safety issues at the waste treatment plant.”
Earlier this year, DOE announced that engineering design errors led to underestimating the effect of seismic effects on the vitrification plant, and that delays and budget increases were in the works. Designers have also overlooked other crucial safety factors, such as hydrogen gas buildup in the pipes, fire suppression concerns, and the like. In the fall, DOE suspended much of the construction on the project, and Congress cut the budget for the plant by $100 million.
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