Timeline of Bechtel & DOE Scrubber Dealings
May 1, 2005
Timeline of Bechtel & DOE Scrubber Dealings
In addition to today’s press release and other materials now available, the Government Accountability Project (GAP) is releasing a timeline documenting evidence of mismanagement and cover-up regarding only one of several defective major systems put into place as part of the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant (WTP). The WTP, also known as the vitrification plant, is designed to mix high-level nuclear waste with glass at extremely high temperatures.
One crucial piece of this process is a large 8,000 gallon tank known as a submerged bed scrubber (Scrubber), the purpose of which is to collect and hold extremely toxic high-level waste vapors during vitrification to be held until a time when the precipitate can potentially be released back into the original process. Since this tank is in what is known as a “Black Cell” area, once this process is initiated, no human being can enter into the area again due to the lethal amounts of radiation in the processes. Therefore, it is essential that the Scrubber’s installation be heavily scrutinized, and if any mistakes were to occur, for them to be corrected immediately. A leaking of this high-level nuclear waste could be disastrous for the surrounding environment and nearby workers and residents.
Below, please find the timeline of major events that occurred with the Scrubber, all with documentation evidence linked from our Web site (see www.whistleblower.org). As you will read among many of the following travesties, Bechtel sent the incorrect design specifications to the sub-contractor that built the Scrubber and realized it later, as did the Department of Energy (DOE), but did not take actions, intending to install the Scrubber early and receive a $15 million fee from the government. Despite numerous obvious safety problems, Bechtel received the fee.
2000 – Bechtel and the DOE enter into a contract to build the Waste Treatment Plant at the Hanford nuclear facility in Washington state. Included in this contract are the details of building and delivering one chief component of the Waste Treatment Plant, the Scrubber. The contract states that DOE will provide a $15 million “schedule performance incentive fee” for the Scrubber’s completion. Click here to see the contract! (see page 6)
September 2001 – DOE reviews documents of Scrubber design specifications and provides the go-ahead for Bechtel to build the vessel. A report states “The inspectors were satisfied that the necessary information was captured…to allow for the identification of proper design standards.” Click here for the report! (see page 25)
4/24/01 – A memo to Bechtel from DOE states that the target schedule for the Scrubber would provide for “Preliminary Safety Review and full Construction Authorization approval by Sept. 2002 – a two month reduction in schedule, and a second limited Construction Authorization for first structural concrete in July 2002 – a 4 month improvement.” This memo signifies, according to Bechtel whistleblowers, Bechtel and DOE’s scheme to “shortcut bureaucratic processes in order to meet deadlines.” Click here for the memo!
6/6/02 – The Joseph Oats Corporation, a subcontractor of Bechtel, begins building the Scrubber using what are later found to be incorrect specifications. Click here for the document!
7/8/02 – DOE acknowledges Bechtel’s commitment to run a “full volumetric scan” on the Scrubber once built, as required by federal guidelines. This is a safeguard to ensure that the vessel will not leak toxic gases or liquids into the environment, potentially causing catastrophic harm. Click here for the document!
Note: In January of 2004 after the installment of the Scrubber it had been found that the volumetric inspection had not been done. Click here to see this document!
7/15/02 – An anonymous employee at Bechtel sends a letter of concern to DOE regarding the management at the Waste Treatment Plant. This includes numerous attachments on the Authorization Basis and Bechtel’s efforts to minimize oversight. The Authorization Basis is the document that refers to the design and construction of the facility to assure safety and integrity of the plant for operational use as a nuclear facility. Click here for the first part of document! Click here for the second part of the document!
7/23/02 – Bechtel replaces the term “confinement” with “containment” in a non-conformance report. “Confinement” specifically relates to the ability of the tank to hold gases and ensure against leakage. “Containment” specifically relates to the ability of the tank to hold liquids and ensure against leakage. Click here to see the document! (see page 8)
Note: Over a year later, Bechtel states that the reason a full volumetric scan has not been completed is due to this confinement/containment semantic error. This shows that Bechtel failed to perform required safety actions on the Scrubber either due to intentional ignorance or blatant incompetence. Click here to see the document! (see page 8)
9/16/02 - 9/20/02 – Upon inspecting the design specifications for the Scrubber, DOE realizes something is wrong. A DOE report states “This is a finding for (Bechtel’s) failure to meet contractual requirements to implement the DOE-approved Safety Requirement Document.” In the Safety Requirements Document DOE requires Bechtel to respond to these shortcomings in 30 days. It is unclear whether Bechtel did. It is at this point that the DOE and Bechtel undeniably know the design specifications for the Scrubber are incorrect, while the Scrubber is already over three months into construction. Click here for the document! (see page 3)
10/31/02 – First inspection of welds on the Scrubber. Click here for the document!
3/6/03 – Internal lower head welds are examined. Click here for the document!
April 2003 – In a letter to Bechtel regarding a corrosion assessment, DOE states that the Scrubber vessel is “still open” and that Bechtel “indicated the open issues have been resolved.” Click here to see the document! (page 13)
6/26/03 – Internal welds and “upper head to shell” welds inspected again. Click here for the document!
9/11/03 – Scrubber leaves Subcontractor Joseph Oates Corporation for Hanford. Click here for the document!
9/22/03 – Scrubber arrives at Waste Treatment Plant. Cracks in the welds are noted by Bechtel in routine shipping damage check. The vendor is called in to fix the welds. Click here for the document! (page 2)
10/2/03 – Bechtel Quality Control Department issues first Non-Conformance Report (Non-Conformance Report) related to the Scrubber. These reports are official internal documents that document “conditions adverse to quality”, and require a formal set of responses and corrective actions, including tracking of the problem and the resolution. Click here for the document!
10/9/03 – Joseph Oates Corporation comes to Waste Treatment Plant and repairs welds. This is evidenced by a presentation from Bechtel and DOE to the Washington State Department of Ecology, which will need to issue a permit for Waste Treatment Plant’s operation, and thus conducts spot-checks on quality-related issues. Click here to see the presentation! (page 2)
10/13/03 – A Bechtel “Structural Integrity Assessment” report states that the Scrubber is compliant with regard to the design. The document is attested to by an engineer under “penalty of law.” Click here to see the document! (page 9)
10/21/03 – By this date, four Non-Conformance Reports were initiated upon receipt of Scrubber by the Waste Treatment Plant. Click here to see the presentation!
10/22/03 – Scrubber is accepted by Bechtel Quality Control and released to the site to be put into place, despite the discovery of obvious defects and the implication that past inspection systems have likely failed. Click here for the document!
10/23/03 – An entry into Bechtel’s QAIS database reveals that Bechtel is aware of “issues with items that had been received but were later found to be out of tolerance or compliance.” It mentions Joseph Oates Corporation welding is not up to specifications and likely is referring to the Scrubber.
10/29/03 – Bechtel identifies problems with Scrubber nozzles. Click here for the document!
11/6/03 – In a meeting between Bechtel and DOE regarding the readiness to install the scrubber, Bechtel states its position that “the cracks were isolated and the tank quality was adequate.” This statement is made despite the repeated discovery of physical defects and the fact that a required volumetric test had not been performed. Click here to see the document!
11/10/03 – Four additional Non-Conformance Reports are filed after an ad hoc inspection. Click here for the document!
11/11/03 – Bechtel installs Scrubber into Waste Treatment Plant. Click here to read the document!
Note: On same date, another Bechtel QAIS database entry discusses the Corrective Action Report that was screened out of the database. This Corrective Action Report, entitled “Failure for Engineering Design to Meet Code or Standard,” mentions that the Scrubber design did not comply with the appropriate codes, making the product likely to be noncompliant.
11/12/03 – Bechtel announces it has installed the Scrubber and asks for the $15 million milestone bonus for installing the Scrubber on time. Click here to read the document!
Note: Pictures are posted on the Bechtel website www.waste2glass.com, and the vessel is mentioned in the Waste Treatment Plant newsletter saying that, “the first schedule performance milestone under the project’s new contract was achieved a month ahead of schedule.” Click here to read the document!
12/16/03 – An inspection by Caliber, an independent contractor to the State of Washington, discovers a deficiency with the Scrubber’s nozzle welds. It describes Scrubber welds with a profile that is not per the design drawings for the apparatus. “Welds had a convex profile and the specification called for a concave profile…Several Non-Conformance Reports have already been previously issued for this vessel, although none on this specific issue…Bechtel is currently in the process of arranging to have all necessary repairs made to the vessel, possibly by the vendor…Caliber Inspection will be notified by Bechtel when the internal inspection of the vessel will be performed and when repairs will be performed regarding outstanding Non-Conformance Reports.” Click here for the document!
12/23/03 – A Non-Conformance Report, issued by Bechtel, is initiated to perform full vessel inspection.
1/9/04 - 4/12/04 – DOE writes full inspection report on Waste Treatment Plant, including Scrubber. Click here for the document!
1/22/04 – A Non-Conformance Report on the Scrubber is issued by Bechtel stating that a volumetric inspection needs be done. Click here for the document!
2/4/04 – An anonymous letter from Waste Treatment Plant employees to various state and federal agencies is written that gives a comprehensive description of how systematic breakdowns led to Scrubber deficiencies. “There are serious weaknesses in the procedure system…The contractor was fully aware that it had not fully met the conditions of Waste Treatment Plant project contract…The hardware was in no condition to be installed...” This letter also states the DOE has asked for their money back and that the vessel is the subject of many CARs, several of which were not completed. The letter also stated that root cause of the Scrubber deficiencies was an Authorization Basis and management breakdown. This letter was sent to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), the arm of Congress that can investigate Hanford dealings from concerned parties, on March 1, 2004. Click here for the letter!
Note: The printout from an employee’s computer screen reveals DOE asked for the performance milestone money back. Click here to see the document!
Note: Bechtel did not return the fee.
2/11/04 – DOE writes Bechtel saying that it was recently informed that a full volumetric inspection was not done on the Scrubber, and that it is concerned that this vessel was installed in the high level waste facility without this inspection. Click here for the document!
2/16/04 – Bechtel initiates a full re-inspection on the Scrubber. Click here for the document!
2/20/04 – DNFSB Activity Report that indicates Bechtel knows the Scrubber was installed despite having the wrong specifications, that full volumetric inspections have not been performed on the scrubber with regard to “confinement” (rather than containment), and most importantly, that the error has been extended to 66 other “black cell” vessels at various building stages. This means that 66 other black cell area apparatuses that handle nuclear waste could need to be rebuilt or scrapped entirely. Click here to see the document!
3/2/04 – A Caliber report describes welds with a profile that are not the correct designs, that several Non-Conformance Reports have been previously issued for this vessel, and shows that Bechtel has not fixed problem outlined in their 12/16/03 report. Click here for the document!
3/3/04 – Bechtel and DOE provide a presentation to DNFSB regarding the Scrubber and its mishaps. The presentation regarding DOE actions states that, in response to the Scrubber fiasco, DOE approved an $11 million** trend to assist in efforts to improve supplier quality performance, thus essentially rewarding Bechtel for its malfeasance. Click here to see the document!
** Note: In a conversation with GAP last week, DOE revealed that this figure is actually $22 million.
3/19/04 – A DOE Memo on Procurement and Quality Control states that Bechtel failed to meet the quality assurance requirements for the procurement of several vessels, including the Scrubber, but ultimately found “no deficiency” because the failures had been found. Click here to see the document! (page 6)
3/26/04 – A DNFSB Inspection Report states that “Testing of the 34 nozzles on the top of the Scrubber found that nine of them needed to be repaired…” Click here to see the document!
June 2004: A letter from a concerned employee gives a comprehensive description of how systematic breakdowns led to Scrubber deficiencies and details the history of the Scrubber. This letter states that DOE and Bechtel managers met and decided that re-payment of the $15 million “was not necessary.” The employees conclude that, “The SBS issue brings into question the quality of every system, structure, and component in the waste treatment plant.” Click here to see the document! (page 5)
6/6/04 – A Caliber Report for May is released with a finding stating that repair work has been completed as per the 17 Non-Conformance Reports on the vessel. However, not all tests were completed accurately. This was brought to the attention Bechtel and as a result, another Non-Conformance Report was issued. Click here to see the document!
6/11/04 – An entry in the QAIS Database states “Joseph Oats Corporation - failure of engineering, inspection, and examination processes (Scrubber)…BNI inspections performed during receipt, as well as subsequent inspections have revealed numerous non-conformances against the BNI Specification and Joseph Oat Corporation drawings and at least one procedure.” This entry indicates a significant breakdown in the Quality procedures of this vendor, and of Bechtel’s failure to detect this breakdown until nearly a year after the installation of the vessel.
6/11/04 – A DNFSB inspection report comes out, which includes the following: “An inspection of the Scrubber has found that several dozen of the internal welds have flaws. Tests data also indicates that the erosion rate for two key vessels containing waste and glass formers is so high they could fail within five years. Click here to see the document!
10/22/04 – A DNFSB weekly report comes out detailing problems with the Scrubber: “Bechtel performed an assessment of the 903 vessel welding and acceptance issues which included 22 nonconformance reports…” Click here to see the document!
3/13/05 – The Army Corps of Engineers released their Independent Review of WTP and Estimate at Completion. In this report, they state that the “Earned fee has been paid for meeting two schedule performance milestones: …Setting the Setting Melter #1 Condensation Collection Vessel on its foundation in the HLW facility ($15 million).” This verifies that Bechtel indeed was paid, and makes no mention of a return of any bonuses. Click here to see the document!
September 2005 – All work on the vitrification plant was suspended due to questions being raised about safety, accountability and cost, including questions about seismic design and the possibility of hydrogen buildup in pipes and vessels.
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