Orders End to Fast-Track, No Construction Until 90% Design Work Complete, 
NRC Given Oversight Role on Nuclear Safety 

The House Committee on Appropriations has slashed the budget for the Hanford waste treatment plant by $90 million, and ordered the Department of Energy (DOE) to end the “fast-track/design-build” method, halting construction until the design work of the plant is 90% complete. The Committee also directed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to assume a nuclear oversight role on the facility, displacing the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

The Committee’s action follows upon recommendations of an in-depth assessment done for the Government Accountability Project (GAP) by the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) published in 2004. The GAP/IPS study warned of significant safety lapses in the design and construction Hanford facility– considered to be the largest, most expensive, and risky environmental project in the United States. The Committee limited the appropriation of $600 million for 2007 by directing the DOE to not spend any of the appropriated money beyond the fiscal year – putting teeth into its reform orders.

The Committee said that the DOE had “done a poor job justifying the budget request of $690 million for the waste treatment and immobilization plant.” The budget for the WTP was slashed by $90 million, to $600 million. The Committee directed the DOE to transfer $10 million to NRC “and to conclude a Memorandum of Understanding with the NRC for WTP oversight activities,” within 60 days of the bill’s enactment.

In harsh language, the Committee reported that the “tank waste treatment program has a long and sordid history” of “consistent project mismanagement.”

The Committee report noted the findings of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) which found that root causes for the 150% increase in cost of the project included “contractor performance problems, DOE management shortcoming and difficulties addressing various technical challenges encountered during design and construction.” The Committee quoted GAO testimony on April 6, 2006 before Congress: “by just about any measure, the Hanford waste treatment project is in disarray”…”what is happening on this project is uncharacteristic of a well-planned and well-managed construction project… great concern to us is the fact that many nuclear safety and other technical problems have occurred on the project.”

“Years of revolving door DOE officials, continual promises to improve management controls and oversight, and sky-rocketing costs have led the Committee to the point where it no longer has confidence in the Department’s estimates in the WTP nor in Department’s ability to manage its way back on this project. Given the potential for serious safety accidents as the result of the lack of management and safety discipline demonstrated on this one-of-a-kind nuclear construction project, the Committee has no other choice than to direct serious management reforms.”

Specifically, the Committee directed the DOE to –

  1. Discontinue using a fast-track, design-build approach for WTP and complete at least 90 percent of the facility design or components of the facility before restarting construction.
  2. Develop revised construction incentives for WTP that better balance cost and schedule incentives to ensure that the facilities operate safely and effectively, as well as improve the Department’s management and oversight of contractor activities. . . .The Department must modify this contract to reflect as accurate scope, a firm cost and schedule, appropriate performance fees or performance incentive fees, and appropriate penalties for non-performance.

The NRC’s role, explained the Committee report, is to provide nuclear safety oversight of the design and construction of the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant. “Under this approach, NRC would conduct an initial safety review of all WTP design and construction work completed to date, leading to the publication of a safety evaluation report. The NRC would then have a role to monitor DOE’s implementation of the findings, and ongoing monitoring of DOE’s nuclear safety compliances at WTP. NRC would review safety-related design documents and integrated safety measures, develop requests for additional information, write a safety evaluation report, and monitor the DOE contractor’s progress in addressing safety concerns raised by the NRC.

Reflecting, perhaps, the lack of transparency by the DOE on the project so far, the Committee report also directed that “interactions with the DOE and contractor would be conducted as necessary and appropriate, in public meetings,” and that NRC would also conduct one or more public presentation near the site to discuss its safety review with stakeholders.

The Committee report expressed disappointment with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, which is supposed to oversee nuclear safety in the DOE complex, for not providing the “rigor of oversight necessary in the construction of a first-of-a-kind nuclear facility with an environmental mission. As such, the Committee directs the Board to close out its oversight activities with the WTP, coinciding with the beginning of oversight activities of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).” DNFSB’s budget was not cut, however.

The Committee Oversight report was released by GAP and made available on its website at www.whistleblower.org early Tuesday. GAP recently released a series of internal documents evidencing mismanagement and safety violations connected with the WTP, and has advocated for an NRC role at the Waste Treatment Plant. Tom Carpenter, GAP’s Nuclear Oversight Program Director, stated,

“The House Committee is right on target with these reform measures. It is more important to have a safe and operable facility than one that is built quickly, but shoddily. Fast-track has turned into a euphemism for a headlong rush over the cliff. The fact that the DOE doesn’t understand this after the years of failure speaks volumes about its lack of oversight capability.”

The Senate Appropriations bill has yet to be released, and the House and Senate must ultimately agree on language before any spending bill is sent to the White House for signing. The process is expected to wrap up by September.